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THE ROLE OF THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN
DEVELOPING PUBLIC LAW
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE WOOLF*
I. INTRODUCTION
In comparison with the United States and many Commonwealth
countries, public or administrative law was slow to develop in Eng-
land. In 1964, Lord Reid said: "We do not have a developed system
of administrative law-perhaps because until fairly recently we did
not need it."' Lord Reid's conclusion is partly explained by two
factors: first, the absence of a written constitution meant that the
English judiciary did not have to pronounce upon constitutional
principles of great public importance; and second, England's lack
of a federal system meant that the courts only rarely had to arbi-
trate between public bodies.
Since 1964, this situation has changed dramatically, and judicial
activism has played a very substantial part in bringing about the
clange. Lord Denning may have been somewhat premature in 1971
when he stated, "It may truly now be said that we have a devel-
oped system of administrative law,"2 but certainly by the begin-
ning of the 1980's this could be said with confidence. In Gouriet v.
Union of Post Office Workers,' in which the House of Lords closely
examined the role of the Attorney General in public law, Lord
Diplock said: "[A]t the heart of the issues in these appeals lies the
difference between private law and public law. It is the failure to
recognise this distinction that has in my view led to some confu-
sion and an unaccustomed degree of rhetoric in this case." '4
Some of England's most distinguished judges, however, have re-
mained sceptical about the desirability of too clearly defining the
parameters that divide our system of public law from that of
* Judge of the Court of Appeals.
1. Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40, 72 (1963).
2. Breen v. Amalgamated Eng'g Union, [1971] 2 Q.B. 175, 189 (C.A.).
3. [1978] A.C. 435 (1977).
4. Id. at 496.
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private law. In 1983, in Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council,5
Lord Wilberforce warned:
The expressions "private law" and "public law" have recently
been imported into the law of England from countries which,
unlike our own, have separate systems concerning public law
and private law .... In this country they must be used with
caution, for, typically, English law fastens, not upon principles
but upon remedies. The principle remains intact that public au-
thorities and public servants are, unless clearly exempted, an-
swerable in the ordinary courts for wrongs done to individuals.
But by an extension of remedies and a flexible procedure it can
be said that something resembling a system of public law is be-
ing developed. Before the expression "public law" can be used to
deny a subject a right of action in the court of his choice it must
be related to a positive prescription of law, by statute or by stat-
utory rules. We have not yet reached the point at which mere
characterisation of a claim as a claim in public law is sufficient
to exclude it from consideration by the ordinary courts: to per-
mit this would be to create a dual system of law with the rigidity
and procedural hardship for plaintiffs which it was the purpose
of the recent reforms to remove.'
Lord Wilberforce, however, was in the minority in Davy. In the
speech that the majority of the House approved, Lord Fraser im-
plicitly acknowledged a distinction between the systems of public
and private law when he asserted that the plaintiff was setting up
his ordinary private rights and thus was entitled to pursue an ordi-
nary cause of action against a public body.7 Nevertheless, Lord
Wilberforce's reference to the influence of remedies on the devel-
opment of English law undoubtedly is accurate and perceptive. In-
deed, the acceleration in judicial activity in the development of
public law is in no small part due to the introduction of the new
remedy of judicial review, which Professor Williams describes in
5. [1984] A.C. 262 (1983).
6. Id. at 276.
7. Id. at 269-75.
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his Article elsewhere in this issue,8 and which is one of the "re-
forms" to which Lord Wilberforce referred.9
Judicial review also has been spurred on by the increasing need
for intervention by the courts into the activities of public bodies.
Over the last twenty years, public bodies increasingly have im-
pinged upon the interests of individuals. Naturally, these individu-
als have turned to the courts for protection from arbitrary use of
the greater powers of public bodies. Increased judicial intervention
also can be attributed to the spread of the party system, which
long had determined who controlled central government, to local
government. As a result of this development, the political party
controlling local government in a locality often was totally differ-
ent from the party controlling central government. When this oc-
curred, disputes would arise, which the courts had to resolve, con-
cerning whether a department of state or a local authority was
exceeding its powers or otherwise acting unlawfully. Litigation in
this area has been particularly prolific during the last two or three
years, as the central government has attempted to impose financial
restraints upon local governments and as local governments have
attempted to establish that the central government has no power
to force its will upon local authorities.
II. THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The courts have responded to the demands made upon them
very much on a case-by-case basis, developing old principles to
cover new situations. In Chief Constable v. Evans,10 Lord
Brightman clearly expressed this approach when he observed: "Ju-
dicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the deci-
sion-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the
court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of
preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping
power."11 Lord Brightman, however, may have underestimated the
role of the court. Lord Hailsham provided a more general, and
8. Williams, Administrative Law in England: The Emergence of a New Remedy, 27 WB.
& MARY L. REV. 715 (1986).
9. See Davy, [1984] A.C. at 276.
10. [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1155 (H.L.).
11. Id. at 1173.
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perhaps better, description of the court's role earlier in the same
case when he stated:
[Ilt is important to remember in every case that the purpose of
the remedies is to ensure that the individual is given fair treat-
ment by the authority to which he has been subjected and that
it is no part of that purpose to substitute the opinion of the
judiciary or of individual judges for that of the authority consti-
tuted by law to decide the matters in question.12
Both Lord Brightman and Lord Hailsham, however, made clear
that the court's task is to ensure that public bodies perform their
duties properly and to quash decisions of these bodies if they are
not taken properly, but that the court's normal role does not in-
clude making the decision itself.
A. Ascertaining the Proper Judicial Role
Lord Diplock admirably encapsulated the proper role of the
court in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service,13 which is commonly known as the GCHQ case. According
to Lord Diplock: "[O]ne can conveniently classify under three
heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to
control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality,'
the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety.' ",14
Lord Diplock went on to define "illegality" as involving decisions
stemming from a misunderstanding of the law that regulates the
decisionmaker's power and a failure to give proper effect to that
law,15 "irrationality" as involving "a decision which is so outra-
geous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that
no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be
decided could have arrived at it,""' and "procedural impropriety"
as involving a decision in which the administrative body failed to
observe not only the basic rules of natural justice but also the pro-
cedural rules expressly laid down in the administrative instrument
12. Id. at 1160.
13. [1985] A.C. 374 (1984).





conferring jurisdiction upon a decisionmaking body.17 Having iden-
tified those three heads, Lord Diplock was careful to observe:
That is not to say that further development on a case by case
basis may not in the course of time add further grounds. I have
in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the
principle of "proportionality" which is recognised in the admin-
istrative law of several of our fellow members of the European
Economic Community.' 8
Lord Diplock's three heads fall within what Lord Brightman de-
scribed as "the decision-making process."'19 Each principle has a
long and respectable history, although the way in which the courts
apply them has changed. The landmark decision in Anisminic Ltd.
v. Foreign Compensation Commission,0 which involved Lord
Diplock's first category, "illegality," illustrates well the judges' new
confidence in this area. That case concerned a decision of the For-
eign Compensation Commission, a statutory body set up to admin-
ister compensation received from foreign countries for property of
British nationals that had been sequestrated by a foreign govern-
ment. A statute expressly excluded the Commission from any obli-
gation to give reasons for its decisions, and section 4(4) of the For-
eign Compensation Act, 1950, which set up the Commission,
provided: "The determination by the Commission of any applica-
tion made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in
any court of law."'' 2 Despite this provision, the House of Lords de-
clared void a determination of the Commission as being ultra
vires. 22 In doing so, as Lord Diplock noted in a later case, the
House of Lords and particularly Lord Reid
liberated English public law from the fetters that the courts had
theretofore imposed upon themselves so far as determinations of
inferior courts and statutory tribunals were concerned, by draw-
ing esoteric distinctions between errors of law committed by
such tribunals that went to their jurisdiction, and errors of law
17. Id. at 411.
18. Id. at 410.
19. Chief Constable v. Evans, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1155, 1173 (H.L.).
20. [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (1968).
21. Id. at 148 (quoting the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 12, § 4(4)).
22. Id. at 173-75.
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6ommitted by them within their jurisdiction. The breakthrough
that the Anisminic case made was the recognition by the major-
ity of this House that if a tribunal whose jurisdiction was lim-
ited by statute or subordinate legislation mistook the law appli-
cable to the facts as it had found them, it must have asked itself
the wrong question, i.e., one into which it was not empowered to
inquire and so had no jurisdiction to determine. Its purported
"determination," not being a "determination" within the mean-
ing of the empowering legislation, was accordingly a nullity.2"
As explained by Lord Diplock, the courts might have been ex-
pected only in a few cases to have gone so far as to find that a
public body had acted "irrationally." That, however, has not been
the case. The courts have overturned a great many decisions of lo-
cal government and even central government bodies on this
ground. One might even say that if the merits have demanded ju-
dicial intervention, the courts have paid lip service to the "irra-
tionality" principle Lord Diplock so accurately described. For ex-
ample, the high-water mark of the courts' interventionist role may
have occurred in Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte Khan,24 in
which Dunn L.J. said: "The categories of unreasonableness are not
closed, and in my judgment an unfair action can seldom be a rea-
sonable one."'25 With this approach, which has not yet been gener-
ally adopted, the court would decide that a tribunal's action was
"irrational" merely by concluding that what was done was
"unfair."
A further illustration of the way that the courts have extended
their role is provided by the landmark decision in Secretary of
State v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council.26 In that case,
the Secretary of State was seeking the assistance of the court in
enforcing an order requiring a local authority to adopt a compre-
hensive system of education. The Secretary of State only had the
right to intervene if "satisfied. . . that any local education author-
ity . . . [has] acted or [is] proposing to act unreasonably. '27 Lord
Wilberforce, describing this provision, said:
23. O'Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 278 (1982).
24. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337 (C.A.).
25. Id. at 1352.
26. [1977] A.C. 1014 (1976).
27. Id. at 1024 (quoting the Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 31, § 68).
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The section is framed in a "subjective" form-if the Secretary
of State "is satisfied." This form of section is quite well known,
and at first sight might seem to exclude judicial review. Sections
in this form may, no doubt, exclude judicial review on what is or
has become a matter of pure judgment. But I do not think that
they go further than that. If a judgment requires, before it can
be made, the existence of some facts, then, although the evalua-
tion of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court
must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into
account, whether the judgment has been made upon a proper
self-direction as to those facts, whether the judgment has not
been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken
into account. If these requirements are not met, then the exer-
cise of judgment, however bona fide it may be, becomes capable
of challenge.28
Having said very much the same thing, Lord Diplock added a
most important gloss. He said, in summarising his views: "[Plut
more compendiously, the question for the court is, did the Secre-
tary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable
steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable
him to answer it correctly? '2 9 This is most important because it
indicates that, in assessing whether or not the Secretary of State's
decision can be challenged, a court may take into account not only
the information on which the Secretary of State based his decision,
but also the information that the Secretary should have had avail-
able when taking the decision. In other words, the Secretary of
State may not demonstrate that a decision was reasonable by
showing, at the relevant time, a lack of knowledge of those impor-
tant facts.
Lord Diplock's third category, "procedural impropriety," pro-
vides the principle that has given the judiciary its most useful
weapon for controlling abuse of power by public bodies. Until rela-
tively recently, this principle was confined to ensuring that judicial
or quasi-judicial functions conformed with "natural justice," a
British counterpart of due process of law. The requirements of nat-
ural justice, however, have developed beyond their initial role, so
28. Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 1065.
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that the courts now require all administrative functions, whether
judicial or not, to be carried out fairly. The extension of the princi-
ple goes back to the decision of Lord Parker C.J. in In re H.K. (An
Infant), 0 an immigration case. Lord Parker said:
Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must,
as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely
bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly;
and to the limited extent that circumstances of any particular
case allow, and within the legislative framework under which the
administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-
called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this
is merely a duty to act fairly.31
Two recent cases decided by the House of Lords illustrate the
development of the "procedural propriety" principle. The first, In
re Preston,32 concerned a taxpayer's attempt to challenge a deci-
sion of the Inland Revenue Commissioners invoking a statutory
procedure to avoid a scheme designed by the taxpayer to achieve a
tax advantage. The taxpayer contended that he previously had
reached a settlement with the Revenue, and that the action pro-
posed by the Commission would go back on assurances it had given
to the taxpayer in that settlement . 3 The taxpayer failed on the
issue as to fact in the House of Lords, but all members of the
House agreed that if the necessary facts had been established, the
courts would have been able to intervene. Lord Scarman, for exam-
ple, said: "[U]nfairness in the purported exercise of a power can be
such that it is an abuse or excess of power. '34 Lord Templeman, in
a speech with which the other members agreed, added that the
court could grant judicial review on the grounds of unfairness
when some element of improper motive had been proved-for ex-
ample, if a public body had exercised or declined to exercise its
powers to achieve objectives that were not the objectives for which
those powers had been conferred.3 5 The public body also could act
30. [1967] 2 Q.B. 617 (1966).
31. Id. at 630.
32. [1985] A.C. 835.
33. Id. at 847.
34. Id. at 851.
35. See id. at 864-65.
[Vol. 27:669
DEVELOPING PUBLIC LAW
unfairly, according to Lord Templeman, if it had established a
code of conduct and then had misconstrued the code, or if it had
been guilty of conduct that, in the case of a private body, would
have given a right to an injunction or damages based on breach of
contract or estoppel by a representation. 6
The second case, GCHQ,37 was significant because it established
clearly for the first time that the courts' power to intervene, and
the duty of tribunals to act fairly, were not confined to statutory
powers, but also applied to the exercise of powers derived from the
Royal Prerogative. The case came before the House of Lords in
consequence of a decision by the Prime Minister that, for reasons
of national security, employees at the Government Communication
Headquarters (GCHQ) no longer could be members of trade un-
ions. The House of Lords made clear that, in public law, the duty
of fairness extended to situations that involved an express promise
given by a public authority or that involved a regular practice of a
public body that had created a legitimate expectation that the par-
ticular course of conduct would be continued.3 8 Normally in such
situations the courts would prevent the public body from departing
from the established course of conduct unless the body previously
had consulted with those who would be affected by the change of
course and had taken into account any representations received
from those consultations. 9 In GCHQ, however, the normal princi-
ple had to give way to the requirements of national security, which
the House of Lords regarded as outweighing the requirements of
fairness.40 But for these requirements, the GCHQ staff would have
retained the relief they in fact had been granted at first instance,
even though as servants of the Crown the staff may not have had
any contractual rights enforceable at private law.
B. Historical Development of Judicial Intervention
In many spheres of administrative law, one can see a developing
process when comparing earlier decisions with more recent ones.
36. See id. at 865-66.
37. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
38. [1985] A.C. at 401.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 403.
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For example, the law regarding prisoners' rights shows the change
in attitude clearly. Although the Bill of Rights, 1689 outlawed
cruel and unusual punishments," the courts until the last decade
had manifested considerable reluctance to become involved with
happenings inside prisons. Even Lord Denning, who perhaps
played a greater role than any other judge in extending the powers
of the court to protect individuals against public bodies, as late as
1972 said: "If the courts were to entertain actions by disgruntled
prisoners, the governor's life would be made intolerable. The disci-
pline of the prison would be undermined. The Prison Rules are
regulatory directions only. Even if they are not observed, they do
not give rise to a cause of action."42
By 1979, the courts' attitude had changed, perhaps influenced by
the European Convention of Human Rights, which is not part of
English domestic law, but which can be taken into account when
courts come to their decisions. This change first was marked in a
Court of Appeal case, Regina v. Board of Visitors, ex parte St.
Germain.4 That case had arisen after a prison's board of visitors, a
lay body exercising a partly supervisory and partly disciplinary
role, had disciplined a number of prisoners for taking part in a
prison riot by depriving them of the remissions they would have
received for good behaviour. Although this remission hitherto had
been regarded as a privilege, and certainly not a right that a court
would protect, the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the
rules of natural justice or fairness had a part to play in prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings. As a result, the court quashed the decision
of the board. In his judgment, Shaw L.J. stated: "Prisoners are
subject to a special regime and have a special status. Nonetheless
they are not entirely denuded of all the fundamental rights and
liberties which are inherent in our constitution. . . . [A] prisoner
remains invested with residuary rights appertaining to the nature
and conduct of his incarceration."'44
The House of Lords adopted this position four years later in
Raymond v. Honey.45 In that case, a prisoner had applied to the
41. 1 W. & M., ch. 36, § 11.
42. Becker v. Home Office, [1972] 2 Q.B. 407, 418 (C.A.).
43. [1979] Q.B. 425 (C.A. 1978).
44. Id. at 454-55.
45. [1983] 1 A.C. 1 (1982).
[Vol. 27:669
DEVELOPING PUBLIC LAW
High Court for leave to commit the prison governor for contempt
of court, and had entrusted the application to the prison authori-
ties to be forwarded to the Royal Courts of Justice.46 When the
prison governor stopped that application, the prisoner applied di-
rectly to the House of Lords, which held the governor in contempt.
In the principal speech, Lord Wilberforce, citing St. Germain,
stated: "[A] convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, re-
tains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by nec-
essary implication. '47 The House of Lords thus made clear that the
courts will ensure that prisoners are under no legal disability with
regard to taking legal proceedings.
The case law regarding other prisoners' rights also shows chang-
ing judicial attitudes. In 1975, the Court of Appeal was not pre-
pared to depart from previous authority holding that prisoners
were not entitled as of right to legal representation before the
board of visitors, notwithstanding the board's substantial powers
of punishment.48 Less than ten years later, however, the Divisional
Court made, if not a 180 degree turn, at least a 160 degree turn,
even though it was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal.
In Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte Tarrant,9 the court con-
cluded that the board of visitors had the discretion to allow a pris-
oner legal representation, and that the only proper way to exercise
this discretion in serious cases was to allow representation. The
courts also have been prepared recently to review how the Secre-
tary of State exercises his discretion under section 12(2) of the
Prison Act, 1952, which provides: "Prisoners shall be committed to
such prisons as the Secretary of State may from time to time di-
rect." 50 In Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte McAvoy,51 an un-
convicted prisoner claimed that his transfer to a prison outside
London had prevented his parents from visiting him and had pre-
vented his legal advisor from properly preparing his case. On the
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 10. "Civil rights" in this context include all general rights possessed at law by
citizens against each other and any rights that arise at law between the citizen and public
authorities.
48. Fraser v. Mudge, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1132 (C.A.).
49. [1985] 1 Q.B. 251 (1984).
50. 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 52, § 12(2).
51. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1408 (Q.B.).
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facts, Webster J. refused relief, but only because the Secretary of
State had taken into account all the relevant factors, including the
full effect of the transfer, the need for the applicant to consult his
lawyers, and "the prisoner's right to be visited by his family or
friends." 52 If the Secretary had not exercised his discretion prop-
erly, the court would have had the power to rule accordingly.
At first sight, the Court of Appeal seems to have adopted a more
restrictive approach to the courts' powers recently in Regina v.
Deputy Governor, ex parte King.53 In that case, the court decided
that it had no power to review a prison governor's exercise of disci-
plinary powers, even though the governor has less disciplinary
power than a board of visitors, whose actions the courts can review.
When examined closely, however, the decision clearly shows that
prisoners are not entirely without a remedy regarding decisions of
prison governors, because prisoners can petition the Home Secre-
tary seeking review of these decisions and the courts can review
the Home Secretary's action in relation to those petitions. The
courts, therefore, would intervene at one step removed.
III. THE NEED To MAINTAIN PROPER RESTRAINT IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Although the courts have shown considerable enthusiasm for ex-
tending the boundaries of judicial review of administrative action,
they have not lost sight of the importance of the balance between
the need to control abuses of power and the need to allow public
bodies to perform their duties without undue interference. Indeed,
the court in King frankly conceded that interference with the gov-
ernor's more limited disciplinary powers purely for policy reasons
would not be appropriate. Griffiths L.J. explained the decision by
saying: "[T]he common law of England has not always developed
on strictly logical lines, and where logic leads down a path that is
beset with practical difficulties the courts have not been frightened
to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution that will best serve
the needs of society." 5'
52. Id. at 1417.
53. [1985] 1 Q.B. 735 (C.A. 1984).
54. Id. at 751.
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Similar warnings have been given in other areas as well. Re-
cently, a number of courts have been asked to adjudicate upon the
legality of ministerial guidance or other conduct not involving an
administrative decision. Courts have reviewed decisions concerning
matters such as the role that nurses have been required to play in
abortions, 55 the lawfulness of distributing a pamphlet giving guid-
ance on how to take one's own life,56 and the lawfulness of doctors
prescribing contraceptives to girls under the age of sixteen without
informing their parents.5 7 In the last of these cases, Lord Bridge
felt the need to give a salutary warning to the plaintiff concerning
the court's ability to review the decision:
Throughout the hearing of the argument in the appeal and in
subsequent reflection on the questions to which it gives rise I
have felt doubt and difficulty as to the basis of the jurisdiction
which Mrs. Gillick invokes .... If the claim is well founded it
must surely lie in the field of public rather than private law.
Mrs. Gillick has no private right which she is in a position to
assert .... But the point which troubles me has nothing to do
with the purely procedural technicality.... My difficulty is
more fundamental. I ask myself what is the nature of the action
or decision taken by the D.H.S.S. in the exercise of a power con-
ferred on it which entitles a court of law to intervene and de-
clare that it has stepped beyond the proper limits of its power. I
frame the question in that way because I believe that hitherto,
certainly in general terms, the courts' supervisory jurisdiction
over the conduct of administrative authorities has been confined
to ensuring that their actions or decisions were taken within the
scope of the power which they purported to exercise or con-
versely to providing a remedy for an authority's failure to act or
to decide in circumstances where some appropriate statutory ac-
tion or decision was called for. 8
Lord Bridge then went on to explain that what was under attack in
that case was no more than advice from the appropriate depart-
ment of health.59 He added:
55. Royal College of Nursing v. Department of Health & Social Security, [1981] A.C. 800.
56. Attorney-General v. Able, [1984] Q.B. 795 (1983).
57. Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1986] 1 A.C. 112 (1985).
58. Id. at 192.
59. Id.
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I think it must be recognised that the decision (whether or not it
was so intended) does effect a significant extension of the court's
power of judicial review. We must now say that if a government
department, in a field of administration in which it exercises re-
sponsibility, promulgates in a public document, albeit non-
statutory in form, advice which is erroneous in law, then the
Court, in proceedings in appropriate form commenced by an ap-
plicant or plaintiff who possesses the necessary locus standi, has
jurisdiction to correct the error of law by an appropriate decla-
ration. . . . In cases where any proposition of law implicit in a
departmental advisory document is interwoven with questions of
social and ethical controversy, the court should, in my opinion,
exercise its jurisdiction with the utmost restraint, confine itself
to deciding whether the proposition of law is erroneous and
avoid either expressing ex cathedra opinions in areas of social
and ethical controversy in which it has no claim to speak with
authority or proferring answers to hypothetical questions of law
which do not strictly arise for decision."
In another decision involving a wholly different field, given on
February 6 this year," Lord Brightman made a similar call for re-
straint in response to the courts' tendency to exercise conventional
jurisdiction to review decisions of local authorities who denied ben-
efits to certain applicants under the Housing (Homeless Persons)
Act, 1977. In a speech with which the other members of the House
agreed, Lord Brightman stated:
I am troubled at the prolific use of judicial review for the pur-
pose of challenging the performance by local authorities of their
functions under the Act of 1977. Parliament intended the local
authority to be the judge of fact. . . . Although the action or
inaction of a local authority is clearly susceptible to judicial re-
view where they have3 misconstrued the Act, or abused their
powers or otherwise acted perversely, I think that great restraint
should be exercised in giving leave to proceed by judicial re-
view. . . . Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left
to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact
involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the de-
batable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to
60. Id. at 193-94.
61. Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 259 (H.L.).
[Vol. 27:669
DEVELOPING PUBLIC LAW
leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Par-
liament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case
where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or uncon-
sciously, are acting perversely.2
IV. CONCLUSION
Of the many valuable lessons learned during the Seventh Anglo-
American Exchange, one of the most important was derived from
the concern, expressed by members of the American team, that the
United States courts during their much longer experience with re-
view of administrative action have not always managed to achieve
the right balance between intervention in administrative action
and judicial restraint in the interests of good administration.
Clearly, the English courts now are showing a similar concern as to
whether, in some fields at any rate, the expansion of judicial activ-
ity has been too fast and too extensive. The warnings now being
given by the House of Lords may be timely, and it is possible that
England now will experience a period of entrenchment.
Whether or not this entrenchment occurs, the English judiciary
without a doubt now can be said to have developed a flourishing
system of public law, following the trail that has been laid across
the Atlantic and in many Commonwealth countries. Although it
may need pruning from time to time, the system is well capable of
fulfilling the purpose for which it has been established.
62. Id. at 283-84.
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